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Abstract 
This note shows that the maximin social ordering, which is wellknown in the social choice theory, is characterized by 
Hammond Equity, Continuity, and Weak Pareto Principle.
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     1. Introduction
This note provides an axiomatic characterization of the weighted max-
imin social ordering, which compares utility vectors based on the least
weighted utilities of the utility vectors. When the weights are symmetric,
this ordering becomes the maximin social orderings. We introduce axioms
named ®-Hammond Equity, Continuity, and Weak Pareto Principle. We
follow the strategy of proof by Fleurbaey (2005, Theorem 3), who gives a
characterization of the Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering in the model of
exchange economy. Note that the Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering is a
kind of maximin social ordering. 1
As long as we know, there are few studies to characterize the maximin
social ordering over utility vectors. Strasnick (1976) characterizes the social
ordering by using axioms named Anonimity, Nonnegativity and Unanimity.
2 Bosmans and Ooghe (2006) prove that the social ordering is axioma-
tized by Anonymity, Hammond Equity, Continuity, and Weak Pareto. In
contrast, our result implies that, when the weights are symmetric, the max-
imin social ordering is characterized by Hammond Equity, Continuity, and
Weak Pareto. Hence, our characterization does not need Anonymity.
The remaining part of this note is as follows. Section 2 gives notation
and deﬁnitions. Section 3 provides our characterization result.
2. Notation
Let N = f1;:::;ng be the set of individuals. R and N are, respectively,
the sets of real numbers and natural numbers. XN = Rn denotes the n-
dimensional utlity space.
A social ranking over utility vectors is denoted by R. For any two
utility vectors u;v 2 XN, [uRv] is interpreted as “u is socially at least as
good as v.” Symmetric and asymmetric parts of R are denoted by I and P,
respectively. A binary relation is a quasi-ordering if it satisﬁes reﬂexivity
and transitivity. A binary relation is an ordering if it satisﬁes completeness
and transitivity.
We deﬁne the ®-maximin social ordering.
1There are many maximin types of social ordering in economic environments, because
of various ways of interpersonal comparison.
2He used also an axiom Neutrality, though this is known to be redundant.
1Deﬁnition: Given a vector of weight ® = (®1;:::;®n) 2 Rn
++, a social
ranking RM(®) is the ®-maximin social ordering deﬁned as follows:






This social ordering compares utility vectors, u and v, based on the least
weighted utilities, mini2Nf®iuig and mini2Nf®ivig. Note that, when ® =
(1;:::;1), this soical ordering becomes the maximin social ordering.
We introduce the axioms to characterize the maximin social ordering.
Weak Pareto: For all u;v 2 XN, if ui > vi for all i 2 N, then uPv.
®-Hammond Equity: Given ® = (®1;:::;®n) 2 Rn
++, for all u;v 2 XN,
if ®ivi > ®iui > ®juj > ®jvj for some i;j 2 N, and uk = vk for all
k 6= i;j, then uRv.
Continuity: For all u 2 XN, if a sequence of vectors (vk)k2N converges to
v 2 XN and uRvk (resp. vkRu) holds for all k 2 N, then uRv (resp.
vRu).
Weak Pareto requires that, if all agents are better in one situation u
than another v, the former should be socially prefered to the latter.
®-Hammond Equity is a modiﬁed version of Hammond Equity proposed
by Hammond (1976). This axiom insists that a reduction of inequality in
weighted utilities between two individuals should be socially accepted. Note
that, when ® = (1;:::;1), the axiom becomes Hammond Equity.
Continuity requires social orderings to be continuous.
3. Characterization
Theorem Suppose that R is a quasi-ordering. Then, R satisﬁes ®-Hammond
Equity, Weak Pareto and Continuity if and only if R = RM(®).
Proof. It is obvious that ®-weighted maximin social ordering satisﬁes the
axioms in the Theorem. We show the converse result. Suppose that a social
quasi-ordering R satisﬁes the axioms. We ﬁrst prove that, for any ulitity





f®ivig =) uPv: (1)
2We ﬁrst show that one can go from v to u through a sequence of utility




i for all i 2 N, or


































Let T = jSj + 2 and s be a bijection from f1;:::;jSjg to S. At every step
t = 1;:::;T ¡ 2, let
(a) ®iz
t+1




k + ² for all k 6= i. (In particular, ®mzt+1
m = ®mvm + t².)
For t = 1;:::;T ¡ 2, the step from zt to zt+1 corresponds to (Case 2)





m = ®mvm + t² < z
t+1
i = ®mvm + (t + 1)² < z
t
i; (2)
where the last inequality is derived from
®mvm + (t + 1)² < ®mvm +
t + 1
n
(M ¡ ®mvm) · M · ®iz
t
i:




i · ®mvm + (T ¡ 1)² < ®mvm + n² < min
i
f®iuig;
where the last inequality follows the assumption regarding ² above.

































By transitivity, zt+1Pzt. Moreover, by Weak Pareto, zT = uPzT¡1. By
transitivity, uPv. Thus, (1) has been shown.
From (1) and the usual argument of Continuity, we can easily show that,





®ivi =) uIv: (3)
By (1) and (3), we have completed the proof. ¤
The axioms in the Theorem are clearly independent.
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